PAPERS ON GRAMMAR

VII

ARGUMENTATION AND LATIN

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Modern revivals of Aristotle's and Cicero's Topics: Toulmin, Perelman, Anscombe/Ducrot

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1. Introduction

In this paper I would like to show the close similarity between a number of concepts of ancient Topics and modern argumentation theory. In order to do this, I will first sketch the historical background, introducing aristotelian concepts like *topos*, *enthymeme*, *paradigma* and ciceronian extensions and modifications of them (section 2). I would then like to compare them closely with recent conceptual counterparts within the theories of argumentation established by Toulmin, Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca and Anscombe/Ducrot over the past few decades (section 3.1-3). Some conclusions from this comparison will be drawn (section 4).

2. Historical Background

Aristotle wrote the classical text on dialogical argument: the Topics, which served as a manuscript for his lectures on dialectic, the art of reasonable debate on the basis of commonly accepted opinions. Dialectical procedures differ from the apodeictic syllogism of his Analytics, where one starts out from true premises to prove or refute the respective conclusion according to formally valid inference schemes, that is, in an absolutely cogent way. Unlike apodeictic syllogisms, dialectical syllogisms are defined by Aristotle as a type of inference starting from probable premises, which can only lead to probable conclusions.

Although the central notion τόπος/τόμος. ("place(s)"") is not defined in the Topics, its basic meaning can be plausibly reconstructed as follows (cf. De Pater 1965: 147ff., whose reconstruction is accepted by Green-Pedersen 1984: 31; Kienpointner 1992: 178ff.; Van Eemeren et al. 1996: 39; but see Eggs 1984: 406ff. for a different point of view): the aristotelian *topos* has two functions, a
selective function and a probative function. Thus, *topoi* are on the one hand search formulas, that is, devices for finding relevant arguments within the set of possible arguments (called διάδοσις: the set of all propositions accepted by all lay people or the majority or by all experts or the majority of them) and on the other hand probative formulas which grant the plausibility of the step from the argument(s) to the conclusion. The second function makes it possible to equate the *topoi* with Toulmin’s inference warrants, at least in this respect (cf. below).

Aristotle also established a complex typology of *topoi* with four major classes and hundreds of particular *topoi* (I count about 400; cf. also De Pater 1965: 163; Bird 1962: 310). His major classes and his principles of classification can be criticized because they rest on the problematic distinction between essential and accidental properties of persons and objects and are not carried through consistently. However, most of the more specific types and subtypes of argument schemes which have been discussed in recent typologies (cf. below on Perelman/Otbrechts-Tyteca 1983) can already be found in the Topics.

Here are two examples: two important subtypes of Aristotle’s typology are τόποι concerning opposites (διάφορα) and semantic relationships of ‘more and less’ (μᾶλλον καὶ ἤπλον). The first subtype can be illustrated with the following example (the general version of *topos* 1. is formulated in Top. 115a 7-8; the specific version (1a.) is given in Rhet. 1397b 15):

(1) If a predicate can be ascribed to an object X more likely than to an object Y, and the predicate is truly ascribed to Y, then the predicate can even more likely be ascribed to X.

(1a) Whoever beats his father, even more likely beats his neighbour.

The second subtype can be illustrated with the following example (Top. 113a 1-19):

(2) If an action Y is desirable in relation to an object X, the contrary action Y’ should be disapproved of in relation to the same object X.

(2a) If it is desirable to act in favor of one’s friends, it should be disapproved of to act against one’s friends.

Modern revivals of Aristotle’s and Cicero’s Topics

Besides inferences which can be classified as dialectical syllogisms, Aristotle also treats another kind of inference which is called ἔπαιθεσις (‘induction’). This is an inductive inference which proceeds from the part (usually, a small number of examples) to the whole (a generalization; cf. Top. 105a 10-19).

Types of inference (or, alternatively: argument schemes) like the dialectical syllogism or induction are closely related to their rhetorical counterparts, which Aristotle discusses in his rhetoric (Rhet. 1395a 16ff.; 1357b 25ff.): the enthymeme (ἐνθύμημα) and the rhetorical example (παράδειγμα). However, both differ from their dialectical counterparts. The enthymeme, too, starts out from merely probable premises, but not all of them are explicit (this is the standard view of the enthymeme; but cf. Burnyeat 1994). The rhetorical example starts with well-known cases and leads to a conclusion about another specific case. Therefore, the rhetorical example, different from the dialectical example, is not a standard kind of inductive part-whole inference, but an inference from part to part (cf. Sprute 1982: 89ff.). The following two examples illustrate Aristotle’s rhetorical argument schemes (3) enthymeme and (4) rhetorical example: bracketed premises ([...]) are implicit:

(3) Dorius won at the Olympic games.

[Olympic games are games where you win a crown] Therefore: Dorius won a ‘crown competition’.

(4) Dionysios wants a body guard.

Example 1: Peisistratos, who later became a tyrant, wanted a body guard.

Example 2: the same is true of Theagenes of Megara

[Peisistratos and Theagenes are comparable with Dionysios] Therefore: Dionysios wants to become a tyrant.

A further type of inference, namely, arguments from sign, is a special kind of enthymeme (cf. Rhet. 1357b 14-16; Sprute 1982: 89), as the following example shows:

(5) [Who has fever, is ill]

He has fever.

Therefore: He is ill.
In Roman rhetoric, most of Aristotle’s theoretical concepts and distinctions were adopted (e.g., Cicero translates ῥώγος as locus and defines it as argumentum sedem, i.e., ‘the place where an argument can be found’; cf. Top. 8). Moreover, a general argument scheme called ratiocinatio or ἐμφείρμα, which was possibly developed in the Aristotelian Peripatos, was integrated into Roman rhetoric (cf. Cicero, De inventione 1.61; Kennedy 1963: 316f.; but cf. Kennedy 1972: 136f., where a Stoic influence is assumed). It shows many similarities with Toulmin’s model (cf. below and Van Eemeren et al. 1996: 54), as display 1 clearly demonstrates.

The ἐμφείρμα consists of the complexio, the controversial claim (or conclusion), the grounds (or arguments), which support this claim or conclusion (adsumptio), the warrant, which guarantees the step from ground/argument to claim/conclusion and which can be equated with the locus in its probative function (Propositio, per quam locus is breviter exposuitur, ex quo vis omnis operet emanet ratiocinationis; Cic. inv. 1.67) and two further justifications of the adsumptio and the propositio, namely approbatio adsumptonis and ratio propositionis, which provide several illustrative examples for the correctness of both adsumptio and ratiocinatio.

In display 2, I quote Cicero’s context-specific application of the ratiocinatio, but refrain from giving more than one of his illustrative examples contained in approbatio adsumptonis and ratio propositionis:

![Display 2](image)

In Roman rhetoric, Aristotle’s typology of several hundred topoi was reduced to a more manageable list of about 20-30 types of loci. Cicero provided two different kinds of classification, a more abstract one, which is more directly in keeping with Aristotle and could be called a typology of ‘dialectic loci’ (cf. his Topica 2.8ff. and, similarly, De oratore 2.163ff.). The categories of the first typology, which became a ‘standard catalogue of loci’ in late antiquity and - in a slightly modified version introduced by Boethius (diff.top. 1201f.; cf. Green-Pedersen 1984: 46ff.) - in medieval times, are listed below:

**Dialectic loci**

I. Intrinisich:

A. ‘within’ the subject under discussion
   1. partitio (definition by whole-part relationship)
   2. divisio (definition by genus-species relationship)
   3. notatio (definition by etymological relationship)

B. ‘somehow’ related to the subject under discussion
1. coniugata (inflectional relationship)
2. genus (genus-species relationship)
3. forma (species-genus relationship)
4. similitude (similarity relationship)
5. differentia (difference relationship)
6. contraria (4 types of relationships between opposites)
7. adiuncta (co-occurrence relationship)
8. antecedentia (logical inference schemes like modus ponens, modus tollens, disjunctive syllogism)
9. consequentia (cf. 8)
10. repugnantia (relationship between contrary opposites)
11. efficientia (cause-effect relationship)
12. effecta (effect-cause relationship)
13. comparatio a maiore (comparison a maiore)
14. comparatio a minore (comparison a minore)
15. comparatio a pari (comparison by identity relationship)

II. Extrinsic:
1. auctoritas (argument from authority)

Despite its enormous historical influence, this standard catalogue shows several weaknesses of classification and presentation, like the partial redundancy of the subtypes (6) and (10) and the inconsistency of grouping formally valid logical schemes like in (8) and (9) together with the other argument schemes, which are all based on plausible semantic relationships between argument(s) and conclusion. Furthermore, Cicero does not distinguish the 4 aristotelian types of opposites in subtype (6) precisely enough. Moreover, unlike Aristotle, Cicero most of the time does not explicitly present abstract versions of the τόμοι/loeci, but contents himself with giving context-specific examples. Here is one for the locus a dissimilitudine / differentia (cf. Cic. or. 2.169), that is, a warrant based on differences between the entities which are the central subjects of the discussion:

(6) Si barbarorum est in diem vivere, nostra consilia sempiternum tempus spectare debent. ("If it is typical for barbarians to live from day to day, our (= the Romans) decisions must be long-term solutions").

In addition to the standard catalogue, Cicero also provided a more context-specific typology of 'rhetorical loci' in his early work De inventione (1.34ff.).

3. Recent Developments
3.1. Toulmin's Model

The year 1958 was decisive for a henceforth flourishing revival of the ancient and medieval tradition of studying argumentation in natural language: in this year, both Toulmin's 'Uses of Argument' and Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca's 'Tracté de l'argumentation. La nouvelle rhétorique' were first published.

In many respects, Toulmin's model is similar to the ancient model called ratiocinatio / ἔπισκεψις (cf. Kopperschmidt 1977: 230; Kopperschmidt 1980: 91ff.; Kienpointner 1992: 22ff.). It amounts to a 're-discovery of the Topics' (cf. Bird's title 1961) because it is conceived as a basic argument scheme at the most abstract, field-independent level and stresses the probative function of the locus / 'warrant' which underlies the argumentation and guarantees the plausibility of the step from grounds to conclusion (cf. also above on Aristotle's dialectical syllogism, enthymeme and Cicero's ἔπισκεψις). I content myself by presenting its structure in a more recent version (cf. display 3 and Toulmin/Rieke/Janik 1984: 79ff.).

The main difference between the ἔπισκεψις and Toulmin's model follows from the fact that 1. in the ἔπισκεψις an additional justification of the grounds (approbatio adductionis) is an element of the scheme; 2. Toulmin has two additional categories qualifying and restricting the strength of the inference from the grounds to the controversial claim (conclusion): the qualifier, which makes explicit the degree of the plausibility of the step from ground to conclusion (e.g. 'necessarily', 'presumably', 'probably', 'possibly'); and the rebuttal, which states exceptional circumstances preventing the step from grounds to conclusion.
TOULMIN'S MODEL

```
  grounds
     |    |
  warrant  qualifier  claim
     |    |    |
  rebuttal
     |    |
  backing
```

Display 3

See the following context-specific example:

```
Hannah Smith
  is a local
  taxpayer

  So, presumably
  Hannah Smith is entitled to vote at town meetings

  All local taxpayers are normally entitled to vote at town meetings
  Unless she is a noncitizen, a minor, a lunatic or other disqualified person

  The relevant legal and constitutional provisions being what they are
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Display 4

Although Toulmin has provided us with a model which can be seen as a useful prototype for the representation of argumentation in natural languages, it can be criticized as representing complex rather than simple argumentation (a similar criticism also applies to the ancient ἀπαθετήτωμα; the transition from backing to warrant is in need of a second warrant (= warrant 2) to grant the plausibility of this step. Likewise, the transition from the rebuttal to the qualifier is in need of a further warrant (= warrant 3). Thus, Toulmin's model can be analyzed as a case of 'subordinatively compound' argumentation (cf. Snoeck Henkemans 1992: 15) consisting of three simple arguments. These simple arguments can all be reconstructed with the help of a basic argument scheme with three main parts: 1. ground/argument, 2. claim (+ qualifier) and 3. warrant. Therefore, it is not surprising that Toulmin/Rieke/Janik often only use these three parts of the model (+ qualifier) to reconstruct simple arguments (cf. Toulmin/Rieke/Janik (1984: 310ff.; 364; 385ff.; 399ff.), and the criticism of Huth 1975: 100; Öhlenschläger 1979: 86ff.; Kopperschmidt 1980: 91ff.; Wohlrapp 1987; Kienpointer 1992a: 28ff.).

3.2. Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca's Techniques of Argumentation

Different from Toulmin, Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca have not tried to formulate a basic, prototypical argument scheme. Instead, they have developed a comprehensive typology of more specific argument schemes, which takes up the Topical tradition. However, their typology is structured differently from the standard catalogue and they also introduced a number of new types which were not (so clearly) recognized in earlier times. Thus, they do not simply take over ancient typologies (like for example Lausberg in his well-known handbook of literary rhetoric 1960: 201ff.).

Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca distinguish two main types of techniques of argumentation: schemes of association and schemes of dissociation. Although they do not treat the schemes of dissociation in the same way as the respective associative schemes, they point out (1983: 565) that one and the same pair of concepts can at one moment be presented as the result of a dissociation and at another moment as the result of an association. Therefore, the same schemes can be seen as means of association and dissociation, or in other words, as means of justification and refutation (1983: 256). I content myself with presenting the associative schemes (1983: 259ff.):
Schèmes de liaison (associative schemes):
I. Les arguments quasilogiques (quasilogical arguments):
   1. contradiction et incompatibilité (contradiction and incompatibility)
   2. identité et définition (identity and definition)
   3. tautologie (tautology)
   4. la règle de justice (rule of justice)
   5. arguments de reciprocité (argument of reciprocity)
   6. arguments de transitivité (argument by transitivity)
   7. l’inclusion de la partie dans le tout (inclusion of the part in the whole)
   8. la division du tout en ses parties (division of the whole into its parts)
   9. les arguments de comparaisons (argument by comparison)
  10. l’argumentation par le sacrifice (argument by sacrifice)
  11. probabilité (probabilities)
II. Les arguments basés sur la structure du réel:
    (arguments based on the structure of reality)
   A. les liaisons de succession (sequential relations):
      1. le lien causal (cause-effect)
      2. l’argument pragmatique (pragmatic argument)
      3. moyen-fin (means-end)
      4. l’argument du gaspillage (argument of waste)
      5. l’argument de la direction (argument of direction)
      6. le dépassement (unlimited development)
   B. les liaisons de coexistence (relations of co-existence):
      1. la personne et ses actes (person-act)
      2. l’argument d’autorité (argument from authority)
      3. le discours comme acte de l’orateur (speech-speaker)
      4. le groupe et ses membres (group-members)
      5. l’acte et l’essence (act-essence)
      6. la liaison symbolique (symbolic relation)
   C. l’argument de double hiérarchie (double hierarchy)
   D. arguments concernant les différences de degré et d’ordre (differences of degree/order)

III. Les liaisons qui fondent la structure du réel:
    (arguments establishing the structure of reality)
   A. le fondement par le cas particulier (foundation by the specific case):
      1. exemple (example)
      2. l’illustration (illustration)
      3. modèle/anti modèle (model/anti-model)
   B. le raisonnement par analogie (reasoning by analogy):
      1. analogie (analogy)
      2. métaphore (metaphor)

For a better understanding, I have added a few remarks concerning the 3 major classes and 30 subtypes of this typology. The first major class is characterized by the similarity of the particular subtypes to formally valid inference schemes, without being, in fact, identical with them (Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca 1983: 259). The second major class concerns argument schemes which are plausible on the basis of assumed structures of reality. Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca stress that they are not committed to any particular world view, but are only interested in the way in which people presuppose certain structures of reality to convince their audience (1983: 352f.). The third major class consists of argument schemes which are used to establish the structure of reality by arguing on the basis of particular cases (examples, illustrations) or analogies and metaphors.

Most of the subtypes of class I are based on semantic relationships which are well-known from the Topical tradition: opposites, identity, similarity and part-whole-genus-species. Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca classify a special case of identity-relationship as a subtype called the ‘rule of justice’ (I.4.). This is an argument scheme containing a warrant which asks for identical treatment of entities or situations which can be subsumed under one and the same category: ‘La règle de justice exige l’application d’un traitement identique à des êtres ou à des situations que l’on intègre à une même catégorie’ (cf. already Perelman 1945). Subtype I.10. is a specific case of I.9.: arguments of sacrifice increase the value of a goal by comparing it with the great effort (‘sacrifice’) which has been invested to achieve it. Subtype I.11., too, is a specific case of I.9.: some entities are considered to be similar enough to justify quasi-probabilistic inferences.
Class II. is also based on distinctions of warrants already known from the Topical tradition: the cause-effect relationship (II.A.), arguments concerning persons and groups (II.B. = loci ‘a persona’), a fortiori arguments (II.C. = loci ‘a maxore / a minore’), arguments involving differences (II.D. = loci ‘a differentia’). But Perelman/Olbrecht-Tyteca also add important new subtypes, for example, II.4.-6.: the argument of waste (II.4.) is used to argue against stopping before the goal of an action has been reached because of the energy already invested for performing the first stages of the action. The argument of direction (II.5.) is used to predict a definitive (disastrous) endpoint of a chain of causes and effects. The argument of unlimited development (II.6.) also concerns predictions about chains of causes and effects, but - different from II.5. - predicts an unlimited (positive) development.

Perelman/Olbrecht-Tyteca’s typology has been very influential and has stimulated a considerable amount of research on argument schemes (e.g. Turello 1979; Kopperschmidt 1989; Warrick/Kline 1992; Kienpointner 1983; 1992; 1993; Mengel 1995; Walton 1996). However, it also shows a number of deficiencies (cf. Kienpointner 1992: 193ff.; Van Eemeren et al. 1996: 119ff.). Among them, the following are the most important ones:

- Given their primarily descriptive interests, Perelman/Olbrecht-Tyteca do not develop sufficient criteria for the distinction between sound and fallacious arguments.
- Perelman/Olbrecht-Tyteca only rarely provide explicit reconstructions of arguments in spite of their clearly expressed intention to reconstruct their internal structure (1983: 251).
- They do not try to develop systematic criteria for the demarcation of argument schemes and they do not even claim that their three major classes are mutually exclusive (1983: 258). In fact, despite the title ‘quasi-logical’, class I relies on semantic relationships (e.g. identity, similarity, opposites) very much in the same way as class II (e.g. cause-effect, person-act, difference). The only distinguishing criterion is the fact that different kinds of semantic relationships are involved.

3.3. Argumentation in Language: Anscombe/Ducrot

The Topical tradition and its central notion τόπος has also been taken up by Anscombe/Ducrot (1983; cf. also Anscombe 1995; Ducrot 1995: 1999 and Bruxelles/Ducrot/Raccah 1995). Extending their earlier studies on argumentative connectives, they define the meaning of a linguistic unit as the bundle of topos which the unit authorizes to be applied (‘Nous prétendrons que le sens d’une unité linguistique est le faisceau de topos dont elle autorise l’application’; Anscombe 1995: 121). Moreover, they try to describe the capacity of each word in the lexicon to evoke a certain number of topos, (Bruxelles/Ducrot/Raccah 1995: 101).

Thus, for example, the sentences (7) and (8) are analyzed as follows:

(7) Il a certainement gelé cette nuit car les plantes sont mortes
(There must have been frost last night because the plants are dead)

This example is analyzed as an argumentative sequence depending on a topos like: //The colder the weather, the more the plants suffer//, which can be reformulated at a more abstract level as follows : //The more X is P, the more Y is Q// (Bruxelles/Ducrot/Raccah 1995: 100, 102).

(8) Pierre est riche: il peut s’offrir tout ce qu’il veut.
(Peter is rich: he can buy whatever he wants)

This example is analyzed as an instance of the following ‘topical form’ (‘forme topique’, in its most general notation (P, Q); more specifically, the following formulas are used: (+P, +Q), (-P, -Q), (+P, -Q), (-P, +Q); cf. Anscombe 1995: 119ff.):

(+POSSEDER, +POUVOIR D’ACHAT)
(+POSSESS, +SPENDING POWER).

As can be seen from the examples above, the topos and topical forms reconstructed by Anscombe/Ducrot, have their counterparts in more or less abstract/decontextualized versions of topoi/loci in the ancient tradition. However, they use the term ‘argumentation’ in a sense differing from many traditional approaches in logic and rhetoric: they characterize ‘argumentation’
as the semantic complex ('bloc sémantique') formed by chains of utterances like 'A done C' (A, therefore C), 'A pourtant non-C' (A, however, non-C). These argumentative chains contain utterances with causal or conditional or concessive relationships ('enchaînements résultats et concessifs', Ducrot 1999: 124ff.). Their general definition of the meaning of linguistic units can therefore be reformulated as follows: the meaning is based on the argumentations triggered by the units ('le sens d'une entité linguistique, mot ou énoncé, réside dans les argumentations, en done et pourtant, qu'elle évoque' (Ducrot 1999: 125).

There are two types of *topoi*: intrinsic *topoi* and extrinsic *topoi*. Intrinsic *topoi* are language-specific. They have to be distinguished from extrinsic *topoi*, which are culture-specific stereotypes (e.g.: 'He is rich, therefore, he is mean'). A test for distinguishing intrinsic and extrinsic *topoi* is the 'mais'-test ('but-test'): if 'P, mais non Q' (P, but not Q) is semantically acceptable and 'P mais Q' (P but Q) is not acceptable, (P, Q) is an intrinsic *topos*. In the case of the *topos* (+POSSEDER, +POUVOIR D'ACHAT) [+POSSESS, +SPENDING POWER], this test confirms the intrinsic status of this *topos*:

(9) Peter is rich, but he cannot buy whatever he wants.
(10) ?? Peter is rich, but he can buy whatever he wants.

If both 'P, but Q' and 'P, but not Q' are acceptable, (P, Q) is extrinsic. In the case of the stereotype mentioned above ('He is rich, therefore, he is mean'), the test shows its extrinsic character:

(11) Peter is rich, but he is not mean.
(12) Peter is rich, but he is mean.

The test, however, is not always applicable without difficulty, which has to do with the notorious problem of distinguishing analytic and synthetic sentences (cf. Quine 1971: 20ff.; Haiman 1980; Michaux 1999). In Ducrot (1999: 125ff.), extensions and elaborations of this distinction and further tests are developed.

Anscombe/Ducrot's approach has become quite influential. It has mainly been used for the study of argumentative particles and lexical units in French (apart from the studies mentioned above, cf. e.g. Roulet et al. 1987; Eggs 1994), but it has also been applied to other languages, notably English (cf. e.g. Noelke 1992; Snoeck Henkemans 1993; Zagar 1995; 1999), but also Latin (cf. e.g. Frut 1989 and her contribution to this volume). Moreover, the extensions summarized above lead to a radically new perspective of lexical semantics, which is applicable to any natural language.

Some problems, however, remain. The problematic distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic *topoi* has already been mentioned. Moreover, one could doubt whether all lexical elements of a language can be described with the help of *topoi* triggered by the respective word. Finally, the precise relationship between *topoi* in Anscombe/Ducrot's approach and their aristotelian and ciceronian counterparts and Toulmin's warrants should be explored in greater detail (cf. Zagar 1999 on this relationship).

4. Conclusions

Apart from many differences in details, the comparison of ancient and modern approaches within the Topical tradition has shown that concepts like the aristotelian rómos, the ciceronian *ratiochinatio*, the typology of argumentative *loca* developed in Roman rhetoric and their recent counterparts within the theories of argumentation developed by Toulmin, Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca and Anscombe/Ducrot have a great deal in common. Moreover, these ancient and modern ideas and concepts can be fruitfully applied to the analysis of argumentative utterances in natural languages, among them (classical) Latin, as other contributions to this volume convincingly show.

References


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Syntaxe et interprétation de *saltem*

Bernard Bortolussi et Lyiane Senajder

1. Introduction

1.1. La particule *saltem* se rencontre avec deux valeurs distinctes:
- une valeur restrictive, largement majoritaire, illustrée par:

   (1) *Feret enim optandum pares aut saltem proximos illi uiro fieri.* (Quint. 10,1,127)
     
     ("Il aurait été souhaitable que ces jeunes gens euissent égalé cet homme admirable, ou tout au moins l’euissent approché.")

- une valeur de renchérissement, limitée à un contexte négatif, illustrée par:

   (2) *Nec quisquam, non rex, non regius, nec de plebe saltem... nuptiarum petitor accedit.* (Apul. met. 4, 32, 1)
     
     ("Personne, ni roi, ni prince, ni même, à défaut, homme du peuple, ne désire sa main ni ne se présente pour l’obtenir.")

Nous montrerons que ces deux valeurs dérivent de la dimension argumentative de *saltem*.

1.2. *Saltem* ne connaît pas d’emploi de type véridictoire, descriptif, ou purement logique; il ne semble pas fonctionner comme adverbe d’énoncé, mais uniquement comme adverbe d’énonciation. A la différence de *quidem, sane, projectio* (Nutine (1998), Risselada (1994)), *saltem* a toujours une valeur argumentative (il n’est jamais là pour souligner une valeur de vérité ou pour renforcer le posé), et cela quelle que soit sa position (cf. en tête de réplique (26) infra):

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